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15 August 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Taylor Report

1. This report was divided into four sections consisting of the following:

- No. 1 - Narrative of the Anti-Castro Operation Zapata.
- No. 2 - Immediate Cause of Failure of the Operation Zapata.
- No. 3 - Conclusion of the Cuban Study Group.
- No. 4 - Recommendations of the Cuban Study Group.

2. The pertinent paragraph of the conclusions reads: "c. The leaders of the operation did not always present their case with sufficient force and clarity to the senior officers of the government to allow the latter to appreciate the consequences of some of their decisions. This remark applies in particular to the circumstances surrounding the cancellation of the D Day strikes."

3. The Cuban Study Group made a total of six recommendations, the gist of which is as follows:

- 1) That there should be established a strategic resources group (this is the 5412 Committee, but working much more on a full time basis on this subject) with a cold war indication center.
- 2) That paramilitary operations when they cease to be covert should be carried out by the Department of Defense.
- 3) That the Department of Defense should make an inventory of paramilitary assets.
- 4) That the JCS should be the Presidential advisors on all military matters.
- 5) That the Cuban Study Group should brief the participants in the Cuban Operation on their findings.

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6) That the government should reappraise the Cuban situation and decide on a definite policy.

4. The following is a chronology of the most significant dates in the report of the Cuban Study Group.

- December 8, 1960 - Col. Hawkins briefed the Special Group.
- January 22, 1961 - Briefing of Rusk, MacNamara, Bowles, and Robert Kennedy.
- January 28, 1961 - The President and Secretary Rusk briefed.
- February 3, 1961 - JCS approved Trinidad.
- March 11, 1961 - Bissell to MSC on Trinidad -- concurred but no prior tactical air support.
- March 14, 1961 - JCS briefed on three possibilities, one of which was Cochinos Bay.
- March 16, 1961 - Bissell told the President Zapata better than Trinidad.
- January 4, 1961 - Hawkins to Esterline: Must knock out Cuban air force.
- April 12, 1961 - President, MSC, JCS briefed on the latest including air strikes on D minus 2 and D Day.
- April 16, 1961 - (D minus 1) President approved landing.
- April 16, 1961 - Bundy at 9:30 p.m. called Cabell to say dawn air strikes should not be launched until they could be done from the beach-head air strip. 10:15 p.m. - Bissell and Cabell to Rusk's office, Hawkins called to tell Bissell to fight cancellation of air strikes. 0430 - Cabell called Rusk and President to ask for U.S. air cover.

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April 17, 1961 - Blue Beach all troops ashore by 0825.
 0930 - SEAFURY sunk Rio Escondido.
 0730 - Parachutist seized San Blas.
 0630 - Houston hit at Red Beach.

5. The following is a quote of Secretary Rusk to the Cuban Study Group:

"...neither the President nor I was clear that there was a D-2 air strike. We did have it in our minds that there would be a D-Day air strike. Following the D-2 air strike there was considerable confusion. It wasn't realized that there was to be more than one air strike in the Havana area. The President was called on this matter and he didn't think there should be second strikes in the area unless there were overriding considerations. We talked about the relative importance of the air strikes with Mr. Bissell and General Cabell at the time. However, they indicated that the air strikes would be important, but not critical. I offered to let them call the President, but they indicated they didn't think the matter was that important. They said they preferred not to call the President."


Lyman B. Kirkpatrick

LBK:jrc